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The decision for a company to issue shares publicly forthe first time is not to be taken lightly. The manager-owner of a private firm must carefully weigh the
benefits of an initial public offering (IPO) against the costs.
Potential benefits include the ability to raise capital in the
public markets on more attractive terms than in private circles;
increased liquidity for managers and other insiders who wish
to sell ownership stakes; and increased recognition and cred-
ibility with customers, employees, and suppliers. These ben-
efits, however, come at considerable direct and indirect costs.
For U.S. firms, the direct costs, such as investment-banking
commissions, average about 11 percent of IPO proceeds.1 Less
obvious, but sometimes more painful for issuing firms, is
an additional indirect cost commonly referred to as “IPO
underpricing.”
Underpricing is the difference between the offer price at
which shares are initially sold to the public and the closing
price after the first day of trading. Put simply, underpricing is
the first-day IPO return. To illustrate how underpricing comes
out of the pockets of the issuing firm’s original owners, con-
sider an IPO with, say, ten million shares offered at a price of
$10.00 per share, making the total IPO proceeds $100 mil-
lion. On the first day of trading the stock price closes at $12.00,
implying that the market value of shares issued is now
Here’s an explanation of why IPO prices seem, at first blush, to be out of line with the actual
marketplace.
1 For a detailed description of the direct costs of raising public debt and
equity, see: Inmoo Lee, Scott Lockhead, and Jay Ritter, “The Costs of
Raising Capital,” Journal of Financial Research, Spring 1996, pp. 59–74.
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IPO underpricing is the price that private firms
pay for investors’ expertise regarding what their
company is worth on public equity markets.
$120 million. Although the capital markets value
the shares issued at $120 million, the original
owners only receive $100 million (less, of course,
fees paid to the underwriter).2 The original own-
ers, in effect, transferred $20 million of wealth
to outside investors. This so-called “money left
on the table” represents a one-day return of 20
percent for investors who bought shares at the
offer price. The magnitude of underpricing in
our numerical example is not out of the ordi-
nary. From 1980 through 2000, underpricing
averaged 18.9 percent of IPO proceeds for all
U.S. firms.3
This magnitude of underpricing raises the
following question: Why do private owners trans-
fer such large amounts of wealth to outside in-
vestors in the process of going public? For inves-
tors, the opportunity to invest in IPOs appears
too good to be true, which raises another ques-
tion: Why not invest in every IPO at the offer
price and sell at the end of the first day?
Our intention in this article is, first, to help
hospitality managers understand the economic
rationale behind the key elements of the IPO
“bookbuilding” process. We make clear the rea-
sons why underpricing is a necessity for manag-
ers of private hospitality firms if they choose to
go public. We also explain why it is not possible
to make easy money from IPO underpricing.
Our second intention is to provide an empiri-
cal characterization of first-day IPO returns for
the restaurant and lodging industries. Our em-
pirical efforts, the first ever to focus on the hos-
pitality industry, serve two purposes. First, for
managers of private hospitality firms who are
considering taking their firms public, our results
provide an historical benchmark for underpric-
ing. Second, beyond benchmarking the cost of
going public, we design empirical tests of the
theories that predict underpricing. As soon will
become clear in our discussion of the economic
rationale for the bookbuilding process, it is pos-
sible to predict the pattern of first-day returns.
Our tests are designed to see whether existing
underpricing theories prove consistent with what
we observe in the hospitality industry.
Akerlof’s Lemons Problem
Our understanding of the economic rationale for
IPO underpricing will be enhanced by a digres-
sion into the market for used cars. In a landmark
1970 study that won a Nobel Prize, George
Akerlof recognized the importance of asymmetri-
cally informed buyers and sellers in the market
for “lemon” used cars.4
Akerlof ’s argument can be illustrated with a
brief example. Consider a market for used cars
in which two equally likely types of cars exist:
good cars worth $20,000 and lemons worth
$10,000. Potential sellers of used cars know what
type of car they have been driving. Potential buy-
ers, however, cannot discern a car’s type merely
from appearances. Instead, buyers can learn what
type of car they bought only after taking posses-
sion and driving it for an extended period. Car
type is thus the private information of owners.
Suppose that all owners sell their cars regard-
less of type. Given that half the cars being sold
are good cars worth $20,000 and the other half
are lemons worth $10,000, buyers ought to be
willing to pay the average of $15,000 for a car.
The problem, of course, is that when given a
2 The numerical example in the text presumes that all shares
are sold under a secondary issuance. The shares issued in
an IPO can include both primary and secondary issues. In
a primary issue, the company raises cash by selling new
shares to outside public investors. The original private own-
ers do not directly receive any cash proceeds from that sale.
In a secondary issue, the original private owners sell part or
all of their equity stakes to outside public investors. The
original owners are, in effect, cashing out with the com-
pany receiving none of the issuance proceeds.
3 Tim Loughran and Jay R. Ritter, “Why Has IPO Under-
pricing Changed over Time,” University of Notre Dame
and the University of Florida, Working Paper, 2002.
4 George Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality, Un-
certainty, and the Market Mechanism,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, August 1970, pp. 488–550.
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choice, potential sellers of good cars are unwill-
ing to part with their car for $15,000. Potential
buyers understand this reluctance to sell good
cars, and thus are only willing to pay $10,000
for a used car since they believe (correctly) that
they are purchasing a lemon. Thus, the market
collapses, with only lemons changing hands at
lemon prices.
This admittedly simple example illustrates two
key lessons. The first is that markets with asym-
metrically informed buyers and sellers do not
work well without intervention. In the market
for used cars, this intervention could take the
form, for example, of a reputable used-car dealer
who inspects and certifies cars as being good. If
buyers trust that the dealer is offering good cars,
the dealer can command a $20,000 selling price.
The key to gaining buyers’ trust is the dealer’s
reputation. As long as the dealer keeps selling
good cars, her reputation is protected and her
business can continue successfully. If the
dealer instead decides to make a quick profit
by passing off lemons as good cars, her reputa-
tion is destroyed and her business is no longer
viable. Financial economists would describe
this market as being in “equilibrium” because,
consistent with car buyers’ beliefs, the dealer
has an incentive to offer good cars for sale
indefinitely.
The second lesson is that an owner cannot
replicate the business model of a reputable used-
car dealer because used-car owners are in the
market only once. Used-car owners, therefore,
have nothing to lose if they are caught misrepre-
senting the quality of their cars, preventing their
promises from being credible (even if they are
telling the truth). The repeat nature of a used-
car dealer’s business, on the other hand, makes
reputation a vital asset.
Challenges in the IPO Market
The IPO market without a financial intermedi-
ary has problems similar to those of the used-car
market without a reputable dealer. Investors who
participate in the IPO market know that they
are at an information disadvantage relative to the
firm’s managers. The managers, for whom an IPO
is a one-shot deal, want to sell shares for as much
as they possibly can. Therefore, if left to them-
selves, managers have an incentive to stretch the
truth about their firms’ prospects. Investors un-
derstand managers’ incentives to stretch the truth
and thus cannot rely on the managers’ statements
about their firm’s prospects. Therefore, investors
lack reliable information to distinguish good
firms from bad firms. Without a third party to
intermediate the going-public process, the IPO
market collapses in a way similar to the hypo-
thetical used-car market that lacks a reputable
dealer.
Investment banks function as the reputable
intermediary in the IPO market. The underwrit-
ing process typically used in the United States,
known as “bookbuilding,” starts with auditors
and analysts from the investment bank working
in conjunction with the management of the
issuing firm to put together what is known as a
“prospectus.” The prospectus, which is delivered
to outside investors, comprehensively describes
the issuing firm’s business, including its future
plans, financial history, and potential risks.
Investors have faith that the information con-
tained in the prospectus is accurate because the
investment bank puts its reputation on the line.
The investment bank is in the business of bring-
ing firms public. If the investment bank is caught
misrepresenting a firm’s prospects in the prospec-
tus, its reputation is tarnished and its future un-
derwriting business suffers. Hence we have an
equilibrium in which investors believe that the
investment bank is reporting accurate informa-
tion in the prospectus, and the investment bank
has an incentive to avoid deviating from those
beliefs.
Why Underprice the Issue?
The investment bank must deal with another,
less obvious, information asymmetry. The man-
agement of the issuing firm would like to get the
highest price possible for its IPO shares. Inves-
tors, in contrast, would like to pay the lowest
price possible. Armed with the prospectus, in-
vestors have accurate information on which to
base their valuations, but will not voluntarily
disclose what they think the shares are worth.
Instead, investors have an incentive to keep their
valuations private and attempt to lowball their
offers in hopes of driving down the price they
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If an investment bank is successful in building
a “book” of truthful indications of investors’ in-
terest, then it will know the aggregate demand
curve as defined by the “smart money” that
determines market prices. …
pay. The investment bank’s challenge is to get
the most that it can for the firm that it repre-
sents in the going-public process. Thus, the in-
vestment bank’s second market-making job is to
get investors to truthfully reveal their private valu-
ations and to set the price at which shares are
offered according to those valuations.
The bookbuilding process is designed to do
just that. As we describe next, the bookbuilding
process entices investors to tell the investment
bank exactly what they think the shares being
offered are worth, knowing full well that the in-
vestment bank will use this information to set
the offer price.5
Let us walk through the bookbuilding pro-
cess to see how the game, so to speak, is played.
An important part of the prospectus is the initial
offer price “filing range.” The filing range might
be set at, for example, $15 to $17 a share. This
$15 to $17 range represents the investment bank’s
best estimate of what the final offer price will be
but is in no way binding. The investment bank
and issuing firm’s management then conduct a
“roadshow” in financial-center cities, where the
firm’s story is told to an invited group of institu-
tional investors (for example, mutual funds, pen-
sion funds, and hedge funds). These investors are
often referred to as the “regular investors” be-
cause this same group is invited time after time.
An important part of the roadshow is the invest-
ment bank’s request of regular investors for their
non-binding “indications of interest” in the is-
sue. The indications of interest are, in effect, in-
vestors’ individual demand curves for the issue.
Returning to our numerical example, they might
indicate how many shares they would like to buy
at a price of $13, $15, $17, $19, and so on. This
process of gathering indications of interest is re-
ferred to as “building the book.” Upon comple-
tion of the roadshow, the investment bank ana-
lyzes the “book” containing all the indications of
interest and sets the offer price and the alloca-
tion of shares to investors.
If an investment bank is successful in build-
ing a book of truthful indications of interest, then
it has in its possession the aggregate demand curve
of regular investors who presumably represent the
“smart money” that determines market prices.
Thus, an investment bank will be able to esti-
mate with a high degree of accuracy the price at
which shares will sell once they begin to trade in
the public capital markets.
Critical to building a book containing truth-
ful indications of interest are the rules by which
the investment bank determines the offer price
and allocation of shares. To get a sense of how
the process actually works, put yourself in the
shoes of a regular investor, and consider how you
would respond to the following set of rules when
asked by the investment bank for your indica-
tion of interest:
• Indications of interest are not binding.
• All investors get their shares at an identi-
cal offer price.
• The offer price is related to the strength
and breadth of interest demonstrated dur-
ing the bookbuilding effort. The stronger
the overall indications of interest, the
higher the offer price.
• Investors that make stronger indications
of interest receive a greater allocation of
shares.
• The investment bank maintains a direct
link between anticipated underpricing
(i.e., the anticipated first-day return)
and the overall strength of the book.
The stronger the overall indications of
interest, the greater the discount.
Let us say that you and the other regular in-
vestors like the deal. If you all truthfully submit
a strong indication of interest, then the invest-
ment bank will increase the offer price and allo-
cate you a healthy number of shares. Importantly,
5 For a formal theoretical model of the bookbuilding
process, see: Lawrence M. Benveniste and Paul A. Spindt,
“How Investment Bankers Determine the Offer Price and
Allocation of Initial Public Offerings,” Journal of Financial
Economics, Vol. 24 (1989), pp. 343–362.
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with a strong book (i.e., strong indications of
interest), the investment bank agrees to under-
price the issue. Remember, if all the regular in-
vestors submit truthful indications of interest (as
they do in this scenario), then the investment
bank has a good estimate of the price at which
the shares will sell once they begin trading. To
underprice the issue, the investment bank sim-
ply sets the offer price below this estimated mar-
ket price. The bottom line is that, by telling the
truth, you are allocated a healthy number of
shares at an offer price that has intentionally
been set below the expected market price.
Suppose instead that you deviate from the
other investors and lie by submitting a weak in-
dication of interest. Your weak indication of in-
terest will result in a weaker book and therefore
a lower offer price, but you will not be allocated
any shares. So, instead of profiting by telling the
truth, you are shut out of the deal by lying.
Let us change the scenario that we have been
discussing by assuming that instead of liking the
deal and truthfully submitting strong indications
of interest, you and the other regular investors
dislike the deal and truthfully submit weak indi-
cations of interest. The investment bank once
again knows the market price at which the shares
will sell once they begin trading. Clearly, the weak
book points to a market price at the low end of
the initial offer range or, for very weak books,
below the range. With a weak book, the invest-
ment bank does not underprice the issue and sets
the offer price close to this market price. As a
member of the regular investor “club,” you will
be asked to buy a number of shares at this offer
price. Moreover, you may be asked to hold a
portion of your shares for a period after the is-
sue. Honoring the request will not, on average,
generate excess losses since shares are bought at
a fair market price, but it will not generate ex-
cess profits either. The reason that you will not
deny the request to buy and hold shares has to
do with the repeated nature of the IPO game.
If, as a regular investor, you refuse to buy and
hold shares in a weak IPO, the investment bank
can rescind your membership in the club. Of
course, a loss of club membership would be costly,
as your ability to profit from your information
would end.
Now suppose that you instead deviate from
the other investors and lie by submitting a strong
indication of interest. In that case, you may be
rewarded for your deceit with a request to buy
and hold even more shares in the weak IPO than
if you had been truthful. As in the case of deals
you like, you are best served by telling the truth
regarding deals you dislike.
The bookbuilding process is what financial
economists call a “truth-telling mechanism.” It
is in investors’ best interest to tell the truth about
what they think of the proposed deal. The rea-
son for this is connected to the fact that issues
with strong books will be considerably under-
priced and that investors will profit by telling
the truth. If the investment bank does not un-
derprice the issue when the overall book is strong,
then investors have no reason to be truthful when
making their indications of interest. To illustrate,
consider your incentive as an investor in the sce-
nario posed above, if instead of underpricing the
issue when the book is strong, the investment
bank sets an offer price exactly equal to the mar-
ket price predicted by the book. Without under-
pricing, if you tell the truth by indicating that
you like the deal, you are allocated shares but
pay exactly what they are worth. So, by telling
the truth, you do not profit without underpric-
ing. You are better off lying in the hope of driv-
ing down the offer price and picking up shares
at depressed prices in the market once they be-
gin to trade. Without underpricing, regular in-
vestors have no reason to participate in the
bookbuilding process.
Is Underpricing a Free Lunch?
We have established that underpricing gives regu-
lar investors the incentive to truthfully reveal their
demand curves for the issue. Without underpric-
…Thus, from those investors’ level of interest, an
investment bank will be able to estimate with a
high degree of accuracy the price at which shares
will sell once they begin to trade in the public
capital markets.
FINANCE                    INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS
22   Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly AUGUST 2003
ing, regular investors are better off keeping this
information to themselves—making underpric-
ing essential to the integrity of the bookbuilding
process. For the management of the issuing firm,
underpricing is thus part of the price that must
be paid for going public. Conversely, for regular
investors, underpricing is the gross profit collected
for participating in the process.
Underpricing is not, however, pure net profit
for regular investors. Underpricing can be
thought of as payment for the information that
regular investors bring to the process. This infor-
mation does not come free. The Wall Street ad-
dresses, computer systems, financial analysts, and
so forth that are all part of the infrastructure re-
quired to gather and analyze information entail
substantial cash outlays. Underpricing goes, at
least in part, to cover these costs.
Before moving on to our empirical study, let
us address one last misunderstanding that is some-
EXHIBIT 1
Hospitality IPO statistics (1981–2001)
Year
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
1981–2001
1981–1989
1990–2001
Mean Offer, Market
Value ($000s)
9,559
8,196
15,365
17,253
11,735
22,951
103,928
—
29,782
19,800
31,004
28,340
37,045
31,020
37,704
48,389
29,807
59,513
32,438
79,500
72,625
32,927
23,566
38,833
Number
of IPOs
0
0
0
2
2
0
3
0
0
0
0
2
6
4
2
9
4
1
0
0
0
35
7
28
Mean Offer, Market
Value ($000s)
—
—
—
23,676
18,000
—
158,350
—
—
—
—
29,410
52,460
48,823
88,440
84,441
36,038
77,625
—
—
—
65,311
79,772
61,696
Number
of IPOs
4
8
15
7
3
4
2
0
3
1
7
9
7
6
5
11
3
1
2
1
3
102
46
56
Mean Offer, Market
Value ($000s)
9,559
8,196
15,365
15,418
7,558
22,951
22,295
—
29,782
19,800
31,004
28,102
23,832
19,152
17,410
18,892
21,500
41,400
32,438
79,500
72,625
21,815
15,013
27,402
Number
of IPOs
4
8
15
9
5
4
5
0
3
1
7
11
13
10
7
20
7
2
2
1
3
137
53
84
Restaurants and Hotels Restaurants Hotels
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times voiced about the IPO market. Some com-
plain that it is unfair for retail investors (that is,
everyday investors such as the authors, editors,
and readers of this article) to be excluded from
buying shares at the IPO offer price. When we
correctly view underpricing as payment for in-
formation, there is a sound economic rationale
for the exclusivity of being a regular investor.
Retail investors do not bring information of
value to the process. If retail investors were al-
lowed to buy shares at the offer price, they would
effectively be free riding on the information-
generating efforts of the regular investors. This
additional cost of free riding would ultimately
be borne by the issuing firm, causing the already
high cost of going public to be even higher.
Hospitality IPOs:
Sample Composition
We obtained our data on hospitality IPOs from
the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) and first-
day closing prices from the Center for Research
in Stock Prices (CRSP). We excluded from our
study any IPO that is missing required data in
either the SDC or CRSP database. We also ex-
cluded any IPO with an offer price less than five
dollars. Our sample, described in Exhibit 1, con-
sists of 137 hospitality IPOs that followed the
bookbuilding process from 1981 through 2001.
We separated our sample into restaurant and
hotel subgroups according to each firm’s Stan-
dard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. The
SIC restaurant classification is narrow in scope,
whereas the SIC hotel classification is more
broadly defined to include management and
ownership firms, gaming firms, and cruise lines.
Our sample comprises 102 restaurant firms and
35 hotel firms.
For each year, Exhibit 1 reports the number
of IPOs and the mean market value of the IPO,
defined as the product of the number of shares
sold and the offer price (i.e., the total amount
raised in the IPO). Except for 1988, at least one
hospitality firm went public every year from 1981
through 2001, with particularly active markets
(or “hot” markets in Wall Street parlance) for
hospitality IPOs in the early-to-mid ’80s and the
mid ’90s. When examined separately, the restau-
rant and hotel IPO markets appear to track each
other closely in terms of their “hot” and “cold”
streaks. Over the entire sample period, hotel firms
that went public raised an average of $65.3 mil-
lion per IPO and restaurant firms raised an
average of $21.8 million.
Initial Filing Ranges and
Final Offer Prices
From our earlier discussion of the investment
bank’s reputation and the prospectus, we know
that the initial filing range for the offer price re-
ported in the prospectus ought to represent the
investment bank’s unbiased assessment of the
final price at which shares will be offered to regu-
lar investors. This is not to say that the invest-
ment bank will always be exactly correct in its
assessment of the value that regular investors place
on the shares. To the contrary, sometimes invest-
ment banks will make too high or too low an
estimate. What it does say is that, on average,
investment banks will get the valuation right.
To test whether investment banks that under-
write hospitality IPOs do indeed get the filing
range right on average, we conduct a straightfor-
ward statistical test. For every IPO in our sample,
we calculate the mid-point of the filing range
reported in the prospectus, and then compare it
to the final offer price that is set after comple-
tion of the roadshow. Specifically, we test the null
hypothesis that the mean difference between the
mid-point of the filing range and the offer price
equals zero.
Exhibit 2, on the next page, shows the mean
mid-point of the filing range versus the mean
offer price for all hospitality IPOs, as well as for
restaurant and hotel IPOs separately. For each
sample, test statistics show that the two means
are not different from one another at conven-
tional significance levels.6 Although investment
banks’ filing-range estimates, on average, were
slightly high for restaurant firms and slightly low
for hotel firms, the lack of statistical significance
in the test of means suggests that investment
banks were not systematically biased in setting
6 The t-statistics for the mean differences for the IPO
samples are as follows: for all hospitality firms, -0.45; res-
taurants, -0.55; and hotels, 0.12. None of these t-statistics
is significant at conventional levels.
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the filing range. The empirical evidence is thus
consistent with the theory that the initial filing
range contained in the prospectus is an unbiased
estimate of the final offer price.
To get a sense of how often investment banks’
filing-range estimates are too low or too high,
Exhibit 3 reports the percentage of IPOs with a
final offer price that falls below, inside, and above
the filing range. For illustrative purposes, con-
sider an IPO with a filing range of $15 to $17.7
The three categories represent a final offer price
below $15, between $15 and $17, and above $17.
More than half of the time investment banks
were successful in setting a filing range which
encompassed the final offer price: to be precise,
52.0 percent of the time for restaurants and 60.0
percent for hotels. Notice that the slight over-
estimate for restaurant IPOs and underestimate
for hotel IPOs, evident in Exhibit 2, are present
here as well. The bottom line, consistent with
the theory, is that investment banks appear to
show no systematic biases in setting the filing range.
IPO Underpricing
Recall that underpricing is critical to giving regu-
lar investors an incentive to truthfully reveal when
they like a particular deal. Without underpric-
ing, the bookbuilding process falls apart. The
natural test of this empirical implication is to
examine whether first-day IPO returns are, on
average, significantly greater than zero. Exhibit 4
presents first-day IPO returns for all hospitality
companies, and for the restaurant and hotel sub-
groups, for the entire 21-year period (1981
through 2001), and the periods 1981 through
1989 and 1990 through 2001.
The average first-day returns for the entire
hospitality sample and the restaurant and hotel
subgroups are consistently positive. For the en-
tire 21-year period, the all-hospitality, restaurant,
and hotel samples exhibited economically and sta-
tistically significant mean underpricing.8 For the
EXHIBIT 2
Mean midpoint of filing range versus mean offer price
$15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
$11.78 $11.70 $11.22 $11.06 $13.41 $13.55
Restaurants
and hotels
(N = 137)
Restaurants
(n = 102)
Hotels
(n = 35)
Mid-point of filing range
Offer price
7 The width of the filing range varies in practice. In the
sample of hospitality IPOs we examine, the filing range was
as small as $0.50 and as large as $3.00.
8The null hypothesis that mean underpricing is zero is re-
jected at the 1-percent level for all subgroups. Specifically,
the t-statistic for the mean underpricing for all hospitality
firms is 7.8; for restaurants, 6.9; and hotels, 3.7.
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sample as a whole, the IPOs were underpriced
an average of 16.5 percent; for restaurants the
underpricing was 16.6 percent; and for hotels
the underpricing was 16.0 percent—strongly
supporting the hypothesis that first-day IPO
returns are, on average, significantly greater
than zero.
We find it interesting that underpricing
increases dramatically in the second half of
our sample period. For all hospitality IPOs,
average underpricing more than doubled from
9.2 percent in the period 1981 through 1989 to
21.1 percent in the period 1990 through 2001.
Showing a more than twofold increase, restau-
rant IPO underpricing grew from 10.1 to
22.0 percent. Showing a more than fivefold
increase, restaurant IPO underpricing grew
from 3.5 to 19.2 percent.9 This pattern of
higher first-day returns for hospitality IPOs
in the 1990s is consistent with the pattern found
by other researchers when all IPOs are examined
together. For example, Loughran and Ritter,
examining all U.S. IPOs regardless of industry,
document average underpricing of 7.4 percent
from 1980 through 1989 and 14.8 percent from
1990 through 1998.10 The explanation
for increased underpricing in the 1990s is a
puzzle for future researchers that we consider in
our concluding remarks.
Pattern of Underpricing
Recall from our earlier discussion that the offer
price chosen by the investment bank is related
to the strength and breadth of interest demon-
strated during the bookbuilding effort. The stron-
ger are the overall indications of interest, the
higher is the offer price. The strength of the book
EXHIBIT 3
IPO offer prices in relation to file ranges
EXHIBIT 4
Mean first-day IPO return
Restaurants
and hotels
(N = 137)
Restaurants
(n = 102)
Hotels
(n = 35)
Offer price below file range
Offer price inside file range
 54.0%  52.0%  60.0%
24.1% 26.5%
 21.9%  21.6%  22.9%
Offer price inside file range
Restaurants
and hotels
(N = 53, 84, 137)
Restaurants
(n = 46, 56, 102)
Hotels
(n = 7, 28, 35)
1981–1989
1990–2001
 21.1%
9.2% 10.1%
16.5% 16.6% 16.0%
1981–2001
 22.0% 19.2%
9 Tests show that, with one exception, the mean underpric-
ing for all hospitality firms, and the restaurant and hotel
samples in the sub-periods 1981 through 1989 and 1990
through 2001 are all statistically significant at the
1-percent level. The exception is the hotel IPO mean un-
derpricing of 3.5 percent from 1981 through 1989 which,
although economically significant, is not statistically sig-
nificant at conventional levels. From 1981 through 1989,
the t-statistics for the mean underpricing are as follows: for
all hospitality firms, 3.8; restaurants, 3.7; and hotels, 1.4.
Over 1990-2001, the t-statistics for the mean underpricing
are: all-hospitality, 7.1; restaurants, 6.0; and hotels 3.7.
10 Loughran and Ritter, loc. cit.
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Restaurants
and hotels
(N = 33, 74, 30)
Restaurants
(n = 27, 53, 22)
Hotels
(n = 6, 21, 8)
Offer price below file range
Offer price inside file range
10.4%
2.8%
 36.1%  37.0%  33.8%
Offer price inside file range
is the price paid to regular investors for truthful
revelation of demand for the issue. As theory pre-
dicts, we consistently observe the greatest under-
pricing when the offer price is set above the fil-
ing range and the least when the offer price is set
below the filing range. For our entire sample,
underpricing for IPOs was 4.5 percent when the
offer price was below the filing range, 13.8 when
it was inside the range, and 36.1 percent when it
was above the range.11 The pattern generally holds
for restaurants and hotels as well. For restaurants,
underpricing was 2.8 percent when the offer
price was below the filing range, 15.2 when it
was inside, and 37.0 percent when it was above.
For hotels, underpricing was 12.2 percent when
the offer price was below the filing range,
10.4 when it was inside, and 33.8 percent when
it was above.12
Exhibit 6 reports the percentage of IPOs with
first-day returns greater than or equal to zero,
conditional on the offer price relative to the file
range. When an investment bank sets the offer
price above the file range, the first-day return was
greater than or equal to zero in every instance.
This suggests that after building the book,
investment banks have a good handle on the
price at which shares will sell once they begin
trading, and know full well that they are under-
pricing the shares to reward the truth-telling
behavior of regular investors. These percentages
serve as a final piece of empirical evidence that
suggests that investment banks are good at
building and interpreting the book.
EXHIBIT 5
Mean first-day IPO return relative to the file range
4.5%
15.2% 13.8%
11 Our results for the hospitality industry are consistent with
the aggregated multi-industry findings of: Kathleen Weiss
Hanley, “The Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings and
the Partial Adjustment Phenomenon,” Journal of Financial
Economics, Vol. 34 (1993), pp. 231–250.
12 Pairwise tests on the restaurant and hotel IPOs show, with
one exception, the same statistically significant differences
across the subsamples. The exception, symptomatic of a lack
of statistical power resulting from the relatively few obser-
vations is that the ‘below’ subsample underpricing is insig-
nificantly different from the underpricing for the other two
subsamples. The t-statistics for restaurant sample are -3.08
for the above–within test, -5.24 for the above–below test,
and -3.69 for the within–below test. The t-statistics for
hotel sample are -2.26 for the above–within test, -1.13 for
the above/below test, and 0.11 for the within/below test.
will thus manifest itself in how the offer price is
set relative to the filing range. A strong book is
evidenced by an offer price that is set above the
filing range. Similarly, a weak book is evidenced
by an offer price that is set below the filing range.
Also recall that the investment bank provides
regular investors with an incentive to truthfully
reveal their demand for an issue by maintaining
a direct link between anticipated underpricing
and the overall strength of the book. The stron-
ger is the book, the greater is the underpricing.
Therefore, putting all of the above together, we
have the testable empirical implication that un-
derpricing should be greatest when the offer price
is set above the filing range and lowest when the
offer price is set below the filing range. Exhibit 5
reports the mean first-day IPO returns condi-
tional on whether the offer price was set below,
inside, or above the filing range.
The pattern of first-day returns across IPOs
is consistent with the theory that underpricing
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EXHIBIT 6
Percentage of IPOs with non-negative first-day returns
relative to the file range
Concluding Remarks
Underpricing is critical to the integrity of the
bookbuilding process. Underpricing gives regu-
lar investors the incentive to truthfully reveal their
demand curves for the issue. Without under-
pricing, regular investors are better off keeping
this information to themselves, resulting in a col-
lapse of the bookbuilding process. For the man-
agement of the issuing firm, underpricing is thus
part of the price that must be paid for going pub-
lic. Conversely for regular investors, underpric-
ing is gross profit collected for participating in
the process. Underpricing is not, however, pure
net profit for regular investors. The research in-
frastructure required to be a member in the regu-
lar investor club comes at a considerable cost.
Underpricing can thus be thought of as payment
for the information that regular investors bring
to the bookbuilding process.
IPO underpricing is a critical consideration
for managers of private hospitality firms who are
considering going public. The increased liquid-
ity, easier access to equity capital, and other ben-
efits that accrue to publicly traded firms must be
carefully weighed against the significant cost of
underpricing. From 1981 through 1989, under-
pricing in the hospitality industry averaged
9.2 percent. From 1990 through 2001, this av-
erage underpricing climbed to 21.1 percent.
The average underpricing that a hospitality
manager can anticipate is an open question. The
answer depends in large part on the cause of the
increase in underpricing witnessed over the last
decade. The trend we document for hospitality
firms is consistent with the pattern found by
other researchers who examined all IPOs together
regardless of industry. 13 Other researchers offer
a possible explanation for the overall increase in
underpricing: a change in the composition of the
firms going public. Their hypothesis is that per-
haps a larger proportion of firms going public
were, say, high-tech start-ups characterized by
great price uncertainty. The information brought
to the bookbuilding process by regular investors
was thus more valuable, justifying higher aver-
age underpricing. Our evidence of dramatic un-
derpricing increases within the hospitality indus-
Restaurants
and hotels
(N = 33, 74, 30)
Restaurants
(n = 27, 53, 22)
Hotels
(n = 6, 21, 8)
Offer price below file range
Offer price inside file range
86%
85%
100% 100% 100%
Offer price inside file range
79%
81%82%
try, however, casts doubt on increased underpric-
ing being primarily driven by a shift to indus-
tries characterized by greater price uncertainty.
Another potential explanation for the increase
is that underpricing was not restricted to pay-
ment to regular investors for truthful informa-
tion revelation, but instead directed to illegal ac-
tivities. This explanation is bolstered by rapidly
accumulating anecdotal evidence reported in the
financial press. 14 A prime example of illegal ac-
tivities is “spinning,” which is the practice by in-
vestment banks of allocating shares in hot IPOs
to executives from whom they hope to win con-
sulting, underwriting, or other business. Unlike
regular investors, these executives are not bring-
ing information to the bookbuilding process.
Hence, because an allocation in a hot IPO is a
13 Loughran and Ritter, loc. cit.
14 For example, see: Randall Smith and Kate Kelly, “More
Disclosure on Distribution of IPOs Looms,” Wall Street Jour-
nal, May 12, 2003, pp. C1, C9.
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surefire money maker, spinning is akin to pay-
ing bribes to executives for steering business to
the underwriting investment bank. These bribes
are not free money. The bribes are ultimately
borne by the issuing firms in the form of in-
creased underpricing.
Another prime example of illegal IPO activi-
ties is investment banks’ illegal practice of award-
ing allocations in hot IPOs to investors in
exchange for commission business. Again, be-
cause such allocations are surefire money mak-
ers, the practice is akin to a bribe for the prom-
ise of paying bloated commissions back to the
investment bank. Once again, the costs are ulti-
mately borne by the issuing firms in the form of
increased underpricing.
As widely reported in the financial press, these
illegal investment banking practices, apparently
rampant over at least the latter part of the last
decade, have been exposed, with the perpetrators
facing penalties. Seeking out remedies to these
and other problems in the bookbuilding process,
the New York Stock Exchange and the National
Association of Securities Dealers recently formed
a special committee. The committee has recom-
mended, inter alia, that investment banks be re-
quired to share with the issuing firm the regular
investors’ indications of interest contained in the
book built during the roadshow and the identi-
ties of all investors who are allocated shares. If
these recommendations are put into practice, the
hope is that underpricing will be limited to pay-
ment to regular investors for the information re-
vealed in their indications of interest. The result
would be decreased underpricing and thus a lower
cost of going public. Time will tell.  
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